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4Summary
Background
In 2002, of the factors affecting inflation, fiscal and wage policy considerably departed
from the path anticipated early that year. The demand generated by general
government increased by more than 4% of GDP, which was significantly higher not
only than the figures forecasted on the basis of the budget in early 2002, but also what
was projected in the government’s Mid-term Economic Programme in August 2002. At
the same time, wage increase in the corporate sector was slow in adjusting to
decreasing inflation and wage dynamics well exceeded productivity growth.
The MNB had to maintain stringent monetary conditions lest the inflation path should
depart materially from what had been projected and the process of disinflation that
commenced in May 2001 should reverse, given the strong upside risk to inflation
generated by fiscal and wage policy. The MNB intended to maintain a relatively strong
exchange rate of HUF/EUR 240-245 until October 2002, and in order to avoid
exchange rate depreciation, it also raised the interest rate by 50 basis points twice. 
However, the Bank did not wish to fully offset the upside risk that fiscal expansion and
wage dynamics posed to inflation. In the interest of the credibility of its inflation
targets, the Bank thought it was important that the government of the day supported
such targets. Therefore, in July 2002, it modified its inflation target for 2003, and set
an inflation target for December 2004 that was fully in line with the government’s
Mid-term Economic Programme.
In the autumn of 2002 it became obvious that fiscal expansion and the rate of wage
growth would be significantly higher than what was forecast in August. Thus, an
exchange rate of HUF/EUR 240-245 seemed to be inadequate to meet even the
modified inflation target. Given the above situation, the MNB did not intend to use its
interest rate policy to prevent the appreciation of the forint that took off after the Irish
referendum. Both the modified 2003 inflation target and the one set for 2004 required
an exchange rate very close to the edge of the forint’s intervention band; thus the MNB
only made two minor interest rate cuts. 
Concurrently with the appreciation of the exchange rate, pressure on the Bank to
considerably reduce its key policy rate was building up. Many called for the
abandoning of the inflation targets or at least its repeat modification. Under the
circumstances a massive interest rate cut would have undermined the credibility of the
inflation targets and jeopardised the process of disinflation through generating higher
inflationary expectations. In stark contrast, the Bank’s interest rate policy
unequivocally evidenced the Bank’s commitment to the process of disinflation, which
was especially crucial in December and January, a period of utmost importance in
terms of changes in prices and wages.
The appreciation of the forint’s exchange rate after 19 October was attributable to the
demand of long-maturity government securities by foreign nationals. No considerable
amount of speculative capital flowed in until 15 January. After the Bank’s interest rate
cut in December, the size of foreign nationals’ government securities portfolio stopped
increasing, with the forint’s exchange rate stabilising near the strong edge of the band.
Though certain market players expected an exchange rate stronger than the edge of the
band already in the final months of 2003 owing to Hungary’s approaching entry into
5the ERM II, market processes did not suggest any short-term speculation on the
appreciation of the forint. 
The attack
In early January 2003,the MNB was ready, if it were to intervene, to lower its key
policy rate to a level where it was able to ensure that the exchange rate would remain
near the strong edge of the band without substantial intervention. On 15 and 16
January, however, the Bank had to face the challenge of extremely heavy speculation
on the appreciation of the forint. Within the span of two days the MNB had to purchase
a considerable amount of euros totalling EUR 5.3 billion owing to massive forint
purchases by foreign speculators. 
The fact that the forint’s exchange rate was near the edge of the band spurred some
market participants to make an attempt at forcing a shift in the band. The speculative
attack was not directed towards profiting on the interest rate differential; rather towards
forcing a shift of the exchange rate band. Neither the MNB, nor anybody else
anticipated this speculation. Nor could it have been, for that matter, as it was irrational
as well as unjustified in many respects. The attack proved that speculators had not been
fully cognisant with the Act on the MNB. Most believed that, independently of the
Government, the Bank had sole discretion to decide on shifts in the band. The very
volume of the capital that flowed in itself made it dubious whether all speculators
would ever have been able to recognise gains on the forints that they had bought.
Through the interest rate cuts and changes to its instruments, the MNB did not take
long to repel the speculative attack successfully. Following the Bank’s action, the
speculative capital started to make its exit in the afternoon of 16 January. 
Consolidation
As soon as the speculative capital started to make its exit, the MNB set about
consolidating the money market and FX market situation that had evolved in the wake
of the attack. The banks funnelled the excess liquidity that had flowed out as a result of
the intervention into O/N deposits placed with the MNB. Falling yields did not lead to
inflationary pressure because of the shortness of the provisional period. The Bank
managed to localise the effects of the speculative attack on the interbank market:
fluctuation in short-term yields fed into long-maturity government securities, bank
deposits and loans only to a negligible extent. The MNB’s presence on the FX market
from the very first moment provided for the possibility of the rapid and controlled exit
of the speculative capital, so that a substantial weakening of the forint’s exchange rate
would not endanger either the process of disinflation or the stability of the financial
system.
The MNB first resorted to open intervention, then to FX auctions and finally conducted
silent intervention in order to ensure the amount of euros needed for the exit of the
speculative capital. Prior to 24 February, foreign speculators had closed over two thirds
of their positions, which enabled the Bank to restore its set of monetary policy
instruments to their pre-speculation status quo. The sale of euros purchased during the
speculative attack went on at a slower pace even after the set of instruments had been
restored. Due, mainly, to the Bank’s silent intra-band intervention, the exit of the
speculative capital was over by May 2003. Over seventy percent of the speculative
6capital that had poured into Hungary on 15 and 16 January exited through the MNB’s
euro sales. To a lesser extent, forint purchases by residents also provided for the
possibility that foreign speculators could close their positions. 
The bottom line of the speculation on the appreciation of the forint. Lessons to be
learnt
The investors who participated in the unjustified speculation in January 2003 had to
post massive losses. As the MNB had succeeded in selling nearly EUR 3.8 billion at a
rate much lower than the upper edge of the band, it realised exchange rate gains
totalling HUF 43 billion. The Bank will pay these gains into the central budget during
three years, starting in 2006. On the whole, the market processes after the speculation
against the forint’s band facilitated the banking sector to increase its earnings and
contributed to an over 50-percent increase in the sector’s after-tax profit in 2003 Q1
relative to the corresponding period in 2002. Banks also posted profit from declining
yields and, through the commissions charged, from increased turnover on the FX
market. 
Fending off the speculative attack successfully enhanced the credibility of the
exchange rate regime. The MNB’s extensive FX purchases and rapid interest rate cuts
attested to its commitment to maintaining the exchange rate regime. Meanwhile, the
exchange rate losses incurred by the speculators made it clear that the Bank was able to
contain speculation against the strong edge of the forint’s band successfully.
Though the speculation on the appreciation of the forint did cause uncertainty, neither
the speculation itself, nor yield and exchange rate changes in its wake put the
Hungarian financial intermediary system in danger. The very provisions of the
financial regulatory system pertaining to financial prudence and the banks’ by-laws
kept risk exposure on a low level, which prevented both the revenues and liquidity of
the banking system from receiving a blow. Commercial banks did not participate in the
speculation on the appreciation of the forint, they only played an intermediary role.
After the speculative attack the Bank had to face a new situation. The exchange rate
band represents more severe limitations on monetary policy than previously thought. In
order to avert future speculation on the appreciation of the forint, the MNB will have to
keep the exchange rate of the forint not only within the band, but also at an adequate
distance from the strong edge of the band. Compared to the period immediately prior to
the speculation, this means obligate monetary loosening. 
In the final months of 2002, a period of utmost importance in terms of price rises and
wage negotiations, the forint’s exchange rate was very near the strong edge of the
exchange rate band, which influenced the disinflationary effects of earlier exchange
rate appreciation beneficially: inflation and wage data from recent months suggest that
at year-end 2002 and in early 2003, the disinflationary effects of a strong exchange
rate, exerted indirectly, and through expectations, heightened. Disinflation accelerated
in the group of goods (e.g. tradables, market services and processed food) that are most
influenced by monetary policy and the exchange rate. Declining oil prices and the fact
that global economic growth is expected to remain subdued also in 2003 further
facilitates the process of disinflation. 
Speculation on the appreciation of the forint in January forced the MNB into
accommodating for a weaker-than-earlier exchange rate. However, the possibility of
meeting the inflation target for 2004 has increased since the end of the speculative
7attack owing to earlier monetary tightening and exogenous factors. Thus, the 3.5 +/- 1
% inflation target is likely to be met even at an exchange rate of HUF/EUR 245.
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Fiscal and wage policies representing an upside risk to inflation 
The Bank continuously monitors all the major macro-economic factors that most affect
inflation. Some are domestic (e.g. fiscal and wage policies), others are exogenous (e.g.
oil prices, the expectations of foreign investors and inflation in the Eurozone). In order
that actual inflation can tally with projected inflation, and economic actors, employers
and employees can be spared any nasty surprise arising from extra costs, the Bank has
to respond to changes in the factors affecting inflation. It is the Bank’s responses to a
changing environment that guarantee that actual inflation tallies with projected
inflation.
2002 had several serious challenges in store for monetary policy, for all major
economic variables turned out to be considerably different from what the Bank
projected early that year. In early 2002, the MNB was of the opinion that the projected
inflation target, 4.5 +/- 1 % for December 2002 and 3.5 +/- 1% for December 2003,
could be met with an exchange rate of HUF/EUR 250-255.1 
During 2002 both fiscal and wage policies came to represent greater upside risk to
inflation than expected early that year. The demand generated by the general
government increased by more than 4% of GDP, which was significantly higher not
only than the figures forecasted on the basis of the budget in early 2002, but also what
was projected in the government’s Mid-term Economic Programme in August 2002. 
Wage dynamics was also more forceful than expected. Compared to a 9-percent
increase in wages projected in early 2002, actual increase was over 13%. Wage raise in
the private sector was by far more substantial than what could have been reasonably
justified by productivity growth: real wages increased by 7-8%, whereas productivity
only grew by a mere 2 %.2
Public spending and wage dynamics generated an unprecedented annual 9-percent
increase in household consumption, pushing up prices during the year.
Stringent monetary policy
A strong exchange rate. An interest rate policy preventing the weakening of the forint’s
exchange rate 
The MNB had to react to the major shifts in fiscal and wage policies lest the process of
disinflation that began in May 2001 should come to a halt or reverse. Therefore, it
intended to keep the forint’s exchange rate relatively high, in the HUF/EUR 240-245
band. Due to the concerns voiced over the general government deficit and the current
                                                
1 As the forint’s exchange rate, a factor that is more important than interest rates in the process of
disinflation, appreciated to a lower level than that in first months of the year, it was possible to lower the
key interest rate several times.
2 The Monetary Council in its statements admonished, first in February 2002, that unless wage dynamics
was able to adjust itself to declining inflation, corporate profitability would seriously deteriorate.
9account of the balance of payments as well as exogenous effects, the forint’s exchange
rate weakened twice. However, the MNB increased its key interest rate by 50 basis
points on both 22 May and 8 July lest the forint’s exchange rate should drop below
HUF/EUR 245 for any length of time.
Modification of the inflation path
However, the Bank did not wish to fully offset the upside risk that fiscal expansion and
wage dynamics posed to inflation. The MNB was of the opinion that, in the interest of
credibility, it was important that the government of the day should also be committed
to the inflation targets. Furthermore, interim costs incurred by declining inflation might
also be lower in the case of concerted fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, in July
2002, it modified its inflation target for 2003, and set a 3,5 +/- 1 % inflation target for
December 2004, which was fully in line with the government’s Mid-term Economic
Programme.3 This target was the same as the former target for December 2003 thus,
the Bank’s agreement with the new government in office put disinflation on a slower
track. 
After the Irish referendum
The Irish referendum on 19 October 2002 had brought about considerable change in
the forint’s exchange rate. It reassured market participants, among them, foreign
investors, who had had worries about the date of Hungary’s EU accession. Following
the Irish referendum, country risk as perceived by foreign convergence investors
decreased significantly and further declined after the final date for Hungary’s EU
accession had been announced. Compared to the risks assumed, yields looked lucrative
to foreign investors. In stark contrast with an earlier situation where the MNB had to
resort to increasing its key interest rate in order to prevent the weakening of the forint’s
exchange rate, after 19 October, capital started to pour into Hungary, leading to the
strengthening of the forint’s exchange rate. The bulk of the capital influx materialised
through the purchase of long-maturity government securities by foreign investors: the
size of the government securities portfolio held by foreign nationals grew from HUF
1,462 billion to HUF 1,793 billion in two months, which translated into an
approximately 1.4-EUR influx. The average maturity of the government securities
purchased by foreign investors was 4.3 years, which unequivocally substantiates the
fact that no short-term speculative capital flowed in during the period in question. 
Concurrently with FX pouring into the government securities market, the forint’s pre-
Irish referendum rate of exchange of HUF/EUR 245 appreciated to HUF/EUR 237
within a month. 
General government deficit and wage dynamics turned out to be higher than projected
in August 2002, thus a HUF/EUR 240-245 rate of exchange set earlier was insufficient
to meet even the modified inflation target. An agreement concluded with Conciliation
Council in November 2002 also suggested wage dynamics stronger in 2003 than
forecast in the inflation projection. Therefore, the Bank did not wish to employ its key
                                                
3 Prior to the modification, the inflation target for 2003 was 3.5 +/- 1 %. After the modification the MNB
sought to meet an inflation target below 4.5%. The latter meant raising the target by 1 percentage point,
for there was no monetary tightening until projection for December 2003 exceeded 4.5%.
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policy rate to prevent the intra-band appreciation of the forint’s exchange rate as such
appreciation further facilitated the Bank to meet its inflation target. The Bank’s 50-
basis-point interest rate cut in each of November and mid-December, which reflected a
decline in the risk premium on forint investments, primarily sought to slow down
appreciation rather than weaken the exchange rate.
As the forint’s exchange rate appreciated so the pressure on the Bank to lower its key
policy rate was building up. Many called for the abandoning of the inflation target or at
least its repeat modification. Under the circumstances a massive interest rate cut would
have undermined the credibility of the inflation targets and jeopardised the process of
disinflation through generating higher inflationary expectations. In stark contrast, the
Bank’s interest rate policy unequivocally evidenced the Bank’s commitment to the
process of disinflation, which was especially crucial in December and January, a
period of utmost importance in terms of changes in prices and wages.
Events immediately prior to the speculative attack of January 2003
After the Irish referendum, major investment banks only anticipated a slow
appreciation of the forint, forecasting an exchange rate staying within the intervention
band until year-end 2003. In early December, however, some investment banks
modified their respective exchange rate projections for year-end 2003 to HUF/EUR
221-225, i.e. an exchange rate outside the band. As a result, market participants’
expectations of the medium-term sustainability of the exchange rate band subsided.
Analysts believed that the Bank’s commitment to the process of disinflation and the
(modified) inflation targets to be met would necessitate further appreciation, on the one
hand, and that central parity might well be adjusted prior to Hungary’s entry into the
ERM II regime, on the other, which would, in their opinion, translate to a higher
exchange rate.
Despite the weakening of the credibility of the exchange rate band, most investment
banks thought that any shift in the band was unlikely in the short run. Instead, they
believed that the MNB would defend the band with deep interest rate cuts or even FX
market intervention if need be. The Bank’s interest rate cut in November reinforced
analysts’ expectations that the Bank was going to defend the exchange rate band by
lowering its key interest rate. 
Although derivative (mainly options) positions speculating against the forint’s band
did appear from mid-November, unlike government securities purchases, they did not
exert pressure on appreciation. Market information revealed that they mostly meant a
6-12-month horizon, which gave no hint whatsoever on a possible short-term
speculation about the appreciation of the forint. 
After the Irish referendum, both the Bank and the Government jointly expressed their
commitment to maintaining the exchange rate band several times. Statements from the
President of the Bank, the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister all contributed to
a slower exchange rate appreciation.
After the MNB’s 50-basis-point interest rate cut on 16 December, capital influx slowed
down. The size of the government securities portfolio held by foreign investors stood
around HUF 1,800 billion before 15 January, and no longer grew. The forint’s
exchange rate stabilised in the immediate vicinity of the upper edge (HUF/EUR
234.69) of the exchange rate band. In early January, there were no signs whatsoever
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suggesting an early shift in the band. On the contrary, the price of derivatives hinted at
an even later date.
The MNB decided not to lower its key interest rate any further as in order that its
modified inflation target for 2003 and the one set for 2004 could be met, an exchange
rate fluctuating near the strong edge of the band was needed. Although the MNB did
sense that the credibility of the exchange rate band could be questioned at a 1-2-year
horizon owing to expectations of Hungary’s ERM II entry, market processes gave no
indication whatsoever of any speculation about appreciation in the short run. What
could be anticipated was that, if convergence investments in the government securities
market kept on at the same pace, intervention at the edges of the band might be
necessary, but it would not incur substantial costs. Therefore, the MNB decided to
make a deeper interest rate cut only when it had to intervene at the edges of the band.
This strategy was meant to send market actors the message that the Bank would prefer
an exchange rate close to the edges of the band, but it intended to avoid any
intervention. However, on 15 and 16 January 2003, it had to intervene on a scale that
could not have been anticipated.
The speculation against the forint’s band
Causes
The speculation about the appreciation of the forint is likely to have been triggered by
a combination of several factors. 
1. Market actors projected a 5-percent inflation for year-end 2003, which was higher
than the modified inflation target. In their estimation this meant that the inflation
target for 2003 could be met only if the forint’s exchange rate exceeded the upper
edge and abandoned the trading band. As inflation policy had been credible, a shift
in the band was anticipated in the interest of meeting the inflation targets.
2. If Hungary were to introduce the euro in 2007, it would have to join the ERM II
regime after its EU accession in May 2004. Though the Exchange Rate Mechanism
II would mean a +/-15% exchange rate band, similar to the going band, market
players estimated that central parity would not be allowed to be very different from
going market rates when Hungary joined the ERM II regime, which in turn meant a
shift in the band. Many market participants anticipated a 2007 introduction of the
euro, which, they thought, meant a shift in the band in two years at the latest; that
again could have given rise to further appreciation.
3. A number of investment banks counted on a consistent and predictable trend in
exchange rate appreciation in the region of Central and Eastern Europe in the
period running up to the introduction of the euro. According to their  analysis,
which was based on the theory of purchasing power parity, the forint’s purchasing
power would have to reach the level at which the currencies of peripheral countries
(i.e. Portugal, Spain and Greece) stood upon the introduction of the euro. Given the
situation, a considerable real and nominal appreciation of the forint could be
anticipated in the years to come.
4. The exchange rate itself, which was near the edge of the band, is also likely to have
spurred market actors to force a shift in the band. They erroneously overestimated
the role of the interest rate channel and believed that the MNB would be unable to
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cut interest rates because of the inflation targets it had to meet. Without cutting the
interest rate, however, a substantial intervention (difference between forint and
euro interest rates stood at 5.75 percentage points prior to the outset of the
speculation) would incur costs on a scale that the Bank would be unwilling to bear. 
Owing to the above considerations, some market participants could easily believe that
a shift in the band was only a matter of short time. The fact that investors and
investment funds that had never had any investment in Hungary before purchased
forint on 15 and 16 January  also corroborates this. 
However, important information, broadly available to the market, escaped the
speculators’ attention, a fact based upon which, it can be stated that the speculation
against the forint’s band was unjustified and irrational. 
1. Pursuant to the Central Bank Act, the MNB and the government of the day shall
jointly decide on any shift in the band. Moreover, the Government voiced its
opinion on several occasions that it deemed the appreciation of the forint excessive.
He who was cognisant with what is set forth in the Central Bank Act, and was
aware that the Government’s stance on the forint’s exchange rate was different
from that of the Bank, could hardly have thought realistically that a shift in the
band providing for the possibility of the forint’s further appreciation would occur.
2. Numerous analysts and market actors relied on the textbook model of major
economies, in which raising interest rates means monetary tightening, whereas
interest rate cuts were  the tool for monetary loosening. This leads to the conclusion
that fiscal policy and wage dynamics representing an upside risk to inflation could
not allow for interest rate cuts. However, Hungary is a small open economy, where
interest rates influence consumption and investment decisions to a much less extent
than the exchange rate. Thus, the rate of exchange plays a more significant role in
disinflation than interest rates do. This also means that the MNB can lower its key
interest rate without actually generating inflation provided that the forint’s
exchange rate does not depreciate. As a result, despite an exchange rate very close
to the edge of the band, the MNB had more latitude in cutting interest rates without
jeopardising its targets than some market participants could have thought.
3. The amount of the capital that had poured in was immense relative to the size of
the Hungarian FX market. Therefore, even if the band had been shifted and the
forint had appreciated, profit realising forint sales by speculators would have
weakened the exchange rate to such an extent that most of them would have been
unable to close their speculative positions in Hungary profitably. 
4. Market participants also underestimated the MNB’s intervention capacity. Thanks
to debt payment strategies adopted in 2002, international reserves had dropped
from over EUR 13 billion prior to the broadening of the band to below EUR 10
billion by year-end 2002. Furthermore, owing to the magnitude of foreign debt
service, it is relatively easy to reduce reserves. As a result, reserves increased by
heavy intervention near the edge of the exchange rate band did not cause any
problem to the MNB. Central bank reserves were not high by international
standards even after the speculative attack.
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The speculative attack of 15-16 January 2003
On 15 January the exchange rate of the forint reached the edge of its trading band. The
MNB, under its commitment to the band, had to sell a total of HUF 213 billion (against
EUR 908 million) at HUF/EUR 234.69 to 14 of its resident partner commercial banks,
which bought forints from the MNB upon their foreign counterparties’ order. The FX
transactions by Hungarian banks revealed that buy orders for large amounts of forint
on the day in question had been placed by 8 major foreign banks, many of which have
subsidiaries in Hungary. The speculative attack was mounted by these foreign banks or
rather the clients they represent. Following the intervention on the first day of the
attack, at an extraordinary meeting in the afternoon, the Monetary Council of the
Magyar Nemzeti Bank decided to lower its key interest rate by 100 basis points
effective from 16 January. 
Although the market had been expecting an interest rate cut, its timing took investors
by surprise. Not only because the decision was made at an extraordinary meeting a
mere two days after the Monetary Council had decided, contrary to expectations, to
leave the key exchange rate unchanged, but also because that same morning, when
asked by the representatives of the press, the President of the MNB, then on a visit in
Vienna, flatly ruled out any interest rate cut, citing the upside risk that fiscal deficit and
wage dynamics represented to inflation. As there had been no intervention before the
President’s statement, it was in line with the strategy that any interest rate cut was only
made after intervention at the upper edges of the band.
Market participants are likely to have interpreted the MNB’s move as the sign of an
imminent shift in the band, rather than the Bank’s commitment to defend the band in
every way possible. Some even voiced their opinion that a shift in the band was as
imminent as the following morning, which is evidenced by the fact that after the
MNB’s trading hours (15.00 hrs), with a turnover completely unusual at this time of
the day, the market rate of the forint abandoned the band, and in the evening
transactions were concluded at a rate exceeding HUF 233. 
The next day, on 16 January, immediately after the FX market opened, foreign banks
purchased a huge amount of forint from their Hungarian counterparties. The Hungarian
banks bought the amount necessary for the transactions from the MNB again. The
forint purchase was especially intense during the first half hour after the opening of the
market, which suggested that market actors had been expecting a rate above the strong
edge of the band in the very short run. Such expectations seem to have been fuelled by
a press conference scheduled on Thursday morning as many speculators had been
anticipating either the appreciation of the central parity or the abandonment of the
exchange rate regime. At the press conference, the MNB President flatly refuted news
reports on both shift in and abandonment of the band and said that in order to defend
the exchange rate regime, the Bank was willing to further slash interest rates. This
somewhat eased pressure on intervention, it was unable to put an end to it, though.
On the second day of the speculative attack the MNB had to intervene at the upper
edge of the band in an amount of HUF 1,020 billion (EUR 4.371 billion). Aggregate
data suggest that Hungarian market actors did have any forint demand on this day
either. They simply intermediated their foreign partner banks’ forint purchases to the
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MNB.4 Although the scope of such partner banks had widened markedly relative to the
15th, major actors were the same, i.e. the ones that were already active on the 15th,
mostly the London subsidiaries of large international investment banks. Intervention at
the strong edge of the band during the two days totalled EUR 5.3 billion, which is
equal to 7% of GDP in 2003. 
Rapid central bank response
On 16 January, the Monetary Council took several steps to defend the exchange rate
band. It lowered the key interest rate by another 100 basis points, put restrictions on the
quantity of two-week deposits and widened the O/N interest rate corridor from +/-1 %
to +/-3 %. The rapid central bank responses, the interest rate cuts and the immediate
announcement of restrictions on the quantity (HUF 100 billion) of two-week deposits
sent a clear message to the speculators that gains on forint purchases were far from
being guaranteed, for they would only be able to place the bulk of their forint liquidity
in deposits at an interest rate lower than the 3.5% rate on O/N deposits. In addition, the
amounts of forints bought by the commercial banks intermediating the speculators’
forint purchases during the intervention at the upper edge of the band, would only be at
the speculators’ disposal in two or three days owing to the settlement procedure.5 As a
result, banks were not for a moment able to place the majority of the amounts of forints
purchased during the speculative attack at an interest rate prior to the interest rate cuts.
They had to place, from the very moment of conversion, in low interest rate O/N
deposits. As non-residents did not specified any interest rate on their placements on the
day of FX sales (they had no intention to keep the money that they would convert in
Hungary), thus banks were able to pass the 4% decrease in the interest rates on O/N
deposits onto their non-resident counterparties right from the beginning.
The market erroneously interpreted the changes in the Bank’s instruments as
suspended sterilisation. In reality, relying on the availability of the O/N deposit facility,
the MNB was able to absorb all excess liquidity in the banking system, with O/N
deposits replacing two-week ones. This resulted in a 5-percentage point decrease in
actual yield at the short end (the most sensitive end in terms of speculation money) of
the yield curve in two days. Such measures combined with the communication strategy
of the Bank committed to maintaining the exchange regime reached their goals. Some
speculators started to sell forints (i.e. close their positions), and further depreciation of
the forint urged others to follow suit. By the end of the day speculation had come to a
halt, with the forint’s exchange rate 5% weaker. 
Cutting the key policy rate on its own would not have resulted in the numerous
advantages that the measures take on 16 January did. As the engine of the speculation
had been expectations of the abandonment of the exchange rate regime, the adequate
extent of interest rate cuts was impossible to calculate. It was obvious that, for a
transitory period, deep interest rate cuts would be necessary to put an end to
speculation and force the bulk of the hot capital of over EUR 5 billion that had poured
                                                
4 This does not, however, rule out the possibility that Hungarian speculators opened long forint positions
at the time. A look at the individual transactions reveals that speculation was also staged through a few
Hungarian brokerage firms; however, its effect was negligible compared to non-resident speculation, on
the one hand. On the other hand, it was offset by the forint purchases by other resident actors.
5 In effect, owing to the fact that 20 January was a holiday in the USA, the value date of the transactions
on the 15th was Friday, 17 January, and that of the ones on the 16th was Tuesday, 21 January.
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into the country within the span of 2 days to exit the market. Therefor, the MNB
decided to separate the permanent part of the interest rate cuts from the temporary one:
it would lower its key interest rate by 1%, however, the yield that the speculative
capital would be able to post will decline by over 3% relative to such rate. 
The 6.5% key interest rate continued to reflect the Bank’s preference for the desirable
interest rate level after the speculative attack, and was clearly different from the one on
the O/N deposit facility effective in the short run. As a result, no extreme fluctuation of
longer maturity yields or interest on deposits and loans materialised,  since these yields
and interest rates were not influenced by the 3.5% O/N interest rate. The modification
of the instruments facilitated communication concerning defence against speculation
and kept distortion caused by defence in interest transmission to a minimum.
The measures taken made it simpler for the MNB to revert, after the consolidation, to a
higher actual level of interest rates needed in normal circumstances for as soon as the
restrictions on quantity had been removed, short-term yields bounced back
automatically to the level of the key interest rate without any change in the base rate. 
The arsenal of the speculative attack
The speculative attack of January 2003 against the forint’s band was different from
earlier speculation aimed at forcing a shift in the band in the former narrow band
exchange rate regime as the volume of the sums transacted and the flow rate of the
capital involved in the former were many times over. As such amounts were
impossible to invest in the Hungarian government securities market, speculators had to
place the forint they had purchased on the FX market in either short-maturity forint
deposits or swaps. 
Chart 1: Hungarian forint (HUF) deposits of non-residents 
with Hungarian commercial banks
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The size of forint deposits held by non-residents grew by approximately HUF 430
billion (Chart Chart 1: Hungarian forint (HUF) deposits of non-residents) on the
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settlement days related to the two days of the speculative attack. This was less than
half of the amount that they had purchased in spot transactions during those two days.
As limits placed by foreign banks on their counterparties do not allow for unsecured
borrowing (placement of deposits), speculation materialised mainly through short-
maturity swaps. The maturity of half of the swap deals concluded on 16 January was
less than 2 weeks. In addition, owing to the special characteristics of the market,
investors can easily close their originally long-maturity positions before maturity. In
the transactions in January non-resident speculators or major international banks
intermediating the transactions in question for them bought forints from Hungarian
counterparties in swap transactions, which were, as a rule, complemented with short-
maturity swap deals. Thus, the combined effect of such multi-transactions was that
speculators placed synthetic forint deposits, hoping that they would be able to close
their positions profitably at a higher forint exchange rate after the anticipated shift in
the band. 
Resident banks did not intend to bear any exchange rate risk. (There are statutory
regulations governing the bearing of such risk anyway.) Accordingly, they sold euro to
the MNB in order to hedge their forward positions vis-à-vis foreign banks, which in
turn means that Hungarian commercial banks, in effect, intermediated speculators’
demand for the forint to the MNB. Thus, the Bank’s intervention at the upper edge of
the band, i.e. its euro purchases, was not vis-à-vis speculators, but commercial banks.
Consolidation
The Bank's strategy, aimed at consolidating the money and foreign exchange markets,
was driven by two basic objectives – meeting the inflation targets and maintaining
financial stability. The two objectives were not in conflict, as they required identical
actions – stabilising exchange rate expectations and helping the speculative capital to
leave as quickly as possible.
Because of its primary objectives, the MNB could not allow a massive and rapid
weakening of the forint exchange rate to force speculators to withdraw their funds. The
reason for this was that a dramatic weakening of the exchange rate, causing massive
losses to speculators, would have jeopardise meeting the inflation target and
maintaining financial system stability. For this reason, the Bank encouraged the
outflow of speculative capital by making it clear that speculators could not anticipate
exchange rate strengthening in the future; however, the MNB offered an opportunity
for them to withdraw at an exchange rate causing modest losses to them.
The MNB adopted an action plan consisting of the following three distinct phases in
order to consolidate the financial market:
1. encouraging the rapid outflow of speculative capital with massive sales of euros;
2. restoring the Bank's monetary policy instruments;
3. after-treatment: encouraging the outflow of speculative funds remaining in the
market by conducting silent intervention.
The Bank did not conduct intervention in the foreign exchange market in the period
between the widening of the intervention band in May 2001 and January 2003. Under
the inflation targeting regime, the Bank controls the exchange rate primarily by raising
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or lowering official interest rates, since international experience shows that in normal
market circumstances the exchange rate can be more effectively influenced by interest
rate policy than by intervention. However, following the intervention near the upper
edge of the intervention band, the amounts of very short-term pro-forint position
remained in the market were so tremendous that they would only have been closed if
the forint had weakened significantly. As a consequence of speculative positions
remaining permanently in the market, in the absence of central bank intervention
volatility of the exchange rate would have increased significantly, forcing frequent and
large changes to interest rates by the Bank. For these reasons the MNB decided to
temporarily use intra-band intervention till the end of speculative capital outflow.
The MNB's main concern was to stabilise the interest rate level. To this end, using
various forms of intervention, depending on market conditions, it was willing to offer
an opportunity for speculators to withdraw which allowed the continuous and
controlled outflow of hot moneys, without risking the substantial increase in long-term
yields and exchange rate volatility.
As the persistence of low interest rates would have influenced financial stability
negatively and would have triggered inflationary pressure as well, the MNB attempted
to restore its policy instruments and raising the extremely low level of interest rates as
quickly as possible. Consistent with this intention, the Bank, by selling large amounts
of euros, contributed to more than two-thirds of foreign speculative capital leaving the
market by end-February. With the restoration of the Bank's policy instruments, the first
phase of consolidation ended on 24 February. Silent intervention marked the third
phase. Despite the Iraq war, this phase lasted until 23 May, associated with fairly stable
exchange rate and market yields. Then, the MNB stopped its intra-band sales of euros,
as the overwhelming majority of capital, flowing in during the speculation about
appreciation, had already been withdrawn. The remaining speculative positions did not
endanger exchange rate and yield stability, even in the absence of the Bank from the
market.
Intra-band sales of euros
Objective of intra-band intervention
Intra-band euro sales had similar importance to that of changes to the Bank's policy
instruments. The Bank recognised right from the beginning that the EUR 5.3 billion
purchased at the upper edge of the intervention band during the speculation on
currency appreciation was enormous compared with the size of the Hungarian foreign
exchange market. In the absence of central bank intervention, the outflow of
speculative capital would have caused the exchange rate to weaken to an extent that it
could have led to the outflow of non-speculative capital as well.
With the sales of euros, the MNB had two objectives as follows:
 First, for inflation and stability considerations, it wanted to prevent an excessive
depreciation of the exchange rate.
 Second, it wanted to give an opportunity for speculators to withdraw. In the
absence of central bank measures speculators would face to the situation that if
they sold forint it would cause weaker exchange rate. This would lead to slower
withdraw and smaller amount of sales.
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The MNB's main concern was to stabilise the exchange rate and the interest rate level.
To this end, using its virtually constant presence in the form of intervention, it offered
an opportunity for speculators to withdraw which allowed the continuous and
controlled outflow of hot moneys, without risking the substantial increase in long-term
yields and exchange rate volatility. 
Method of selling euros
Interventions in the foreign exchange market conducted after the speculative attack
were fundamentally different from usual central bank interventions. As the undesired,
excessive weakening of the exchange rate failed to materialise, the Bank's
interventions, unlike those by other central banks, were not aimed at directly
influencing the exchange rate. Basically, the Bank sold euros for the purposes of
handling a quantity problem – enormous amounts of speculative short-term forint
assets were in the market relative to the size of the market, which posed a substantial
downward risk on the exchange rate. Due to the above considerations, the MNB
attempted during the entire management of appreciation speculation to not give
concrete price signals to market participants with the interventions.
The first intervention took place on Friday, 17 January. On this occasion, the Bank
conducted open market intervention at the market rate, in order to stabilise the market.
Following its entry into the market, the exchange rate stabilised around the supposed
intervention rate, i.e. HUF/EUR 245.
Even if open intervention managed to stabilise the market and reduce exchange rate
volatility considerably, contrary to MNB’s intentions, it reinforced market participants’
beliefs that the exchange rate would appreciate considerably in a short time, which
slowed down the outflow of the speculative capital involved. Therefore, so as to
increase speculative uncertainty, the MNB decide to withdraw temporarily from the
open FX market and switch to a silent way of central bank intervention. In line with the
Bank’s expectations, this resulted in slow exchange rate depreciation: once again the
forint’s exchange rate had depreciated to nearly HUF/EUR 250 by 22 January. 
As the outflow of the speculative capital took longer than expected, the MNB decided
on adopting a contingency intervention technique never employed before. From 27
January, the MNB called for euro sales bids for 4 consecutive days. Bidders could
submit 5 different euro purchase bids for the auction until 12.00 hours. The MNB
notified each bidder at 14.00 hours. 
Although auctions managed to generate a large volume of euro sales on the whole, they
only partially achieved their original aim, i.e. dismantling speculative positions at a
realistic rate of exchange. Announcing the auctions led to a steady appreciation of the
forint’s exchange rate, as the market did not interpret this move as an offer to
speculators to exit the market. Rather, it interpreted the auctions as a sign of the
MNB’s preference for a stronger rate of exchange. The forint strengthened from
HUF/EUR 247 on Monday morning to HUF/EUR 242.5 on Wednesday, and then it
weakened again after the last auction, standing at HUF/EUR 244-245. Certain
components of the contingency intervention technique, including the fact that the
Bank, so as to avoid sending any undesirable exchange rate messages, decided not to
publish the aggregate result of the individual auctions, even provoked criticism from
the market participants affected. At an extraordinary meeting the representatives of the
Bank informed the expert panel of the Hungarian Forex Society of the objectives of the
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auctions as well as the considerations adopted in working out the solutions that had
been agreed on.
Chart 2: The forint/euro exchange rate and euro sales by the MNB
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Open intervention and auctions taught the MNB the lesson that the market had
interpreted the Bank’s announced FX sales as a sign of the Bank’s intention to
appreciate the exchange rate, which did not step up the outflow of the speculative
capital. Therefore, after the FX auctions the MNB gave up the open sales of the euro,
however, it continued silent intervention, which meant that the Bank, as one of the
actors on the OTC market, sold euro at the going market rate to its FX market business
partners under the effective limit system. One of the major considerations in the
intervention was to ensure balanced market prices and satisfactory market liquidity.
Using the above intervention channels, by 24 February the MNB had sold
approximately half of the amounts of euros that it had bought while intervening at the
upper edge of the band, which allowed for the possibility of the Bank’s restoring its
instruments, with the speculative positions wound up in various different ways (See
below).
Exit of the speculative capital
The foreign participants involved in the intervention already began to close their
respective forint positions in the afternoon, 16 January. Simultaneously, Hungarian
banks and resident non-bank actors opened positions of over HUF 80 billion in the
forint. Non-residents went on closing their respective positions (i.e. selling forint) on
the following day and the day after. The outflow of the foreign speculative capital was
an ongoing process until 24 February 2003, when the Bank restored its instrumental
framework. As the bulk of the speculative capital had already flowed out, the rate of its
outflow slowed down significantly after the Bank had reinstated its instrumental
framework. 
The size of non-residents’ closing their respective positions exceeded the volume of
the Bank’s intra-band euro sales. The reason for that was that resident actors too made
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the most of the exchange rate weakened by the continuous exit of non-residents in
order to open (mainly forward) positions in the forint.
In ten days resident actors opened positions of HUF 400 billion in the forint during the
exchange rate depreciation following the attack against the forint’s band (Chart 3). The
information available to the Bank does not give any direct indication as to how much
of this amount went into hedging and how much was spent on speculative purchases. 
Chart 3: Long forint positions taken by residents and non-residents (cumulated from 1 January 2003)
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The 16 January level differs from the size of all speculative positions taken by non-
residents (Table 1) as the closing of the speculative positions commenced in the
afternoon.
Information from banks suggests that the number of hedge transactions concluded by
exporters and companies which, for other fundamental reasons, held short forint
positions, was substantial in the initial phase of the exchange rate depreciation.
Hedgers sold FX from their later export revenues at an exchange rate that already had
been set. The outcome was that the majority of such actors were unlikely to close their
positions before actual revenues were produced. 
The MNB has managed to sell more than 70 percent (i.e. EUR 3.8 billion) of the EUR
5.3 billion bought in mid-January until 23 May. There is a one-billion resident and
approximately 200-million non-resident position (at a rate of HUF/EUR 245.9) against
the remaining 1.2 billion euro position. The remaining portion is the MNB’s 241-
million-euro exchange rate gains, of which it has realised approximately EUR 174
million through its intra-band intervention.
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Table 1: Long forint positions taken by residents, non-residents and the MNB (intervention) during and
since the speculative attack
Resident Non-resident Intervention Resident Non-resident
Exchange rate 
effect Intervention
During the speculative attack 19 1220 1239 81 5198 5279
Since the end of the speculative 
attack 227 -1164 -937 924 -4735 -3811
Total positions taken (evaluated at 
average buy-back rate) 
246 56 302 1001 226 241 1469
billion forints million euros
Despite the fact that the value of the euro sales by the MNB is below that of the Bank’s
intervention at the strong edge of the band, it is safe to assume that the whole amount
of the speculative capital had exited the market before 23 May. The forint’s exchange
rate is approximately 10 forints weaker than it was at the time of the speculative attack
against the forint’s band. Given this rate of exchange, FX market actors, i.e. exporters
dealing in hedge transactions and non-resident government securities investors, are
more willing to take up larger derivative positions in the forint. Some of the
speculative capital, i.e. approximately EUR 1.2 billion, left the country through the
transactions of market players, who purchased forint from the speculators in order to
hedge their exchange rage exposure, rather than through those of the MNB. This means
that more than 70 percent of the speculative capital exited through the MNB’s euro
sales, whereas one-third of the speculative positions was transformed into hedges.
A new scenario for monetary policy
The MNB had to react to the speculative attack against the forint’s band by doing more
than merely issuing the speculation about the forint’s appreciation. The main lesson
that the MNB has learnt from the speculative attack is that, with such an attack
mounted, an exchange rate approaching again the upper edge of the band poses a risk.
Thus, after the attack the Bank has to face a new situation. The exchange band
represents narrower limits for monetary policy than expected earlier. In order to
prevent another instance of speculation, the MNB will have to keep the forint’s
exchange rate not only within the band, but also at an appropriate length from the
upper edge. This revelation also means that there is a limit to exchange rate
appreciation and the restriction of monetary conditions. 
Inflation projection in February suggested inflation that is higher than the modified
target (less than 4.5%) for December 2003 mainly owing to factors (e.g. oil prices and
regulated prices) exogenous to monetary policy. Projection is, however, for an
approximately 4% in 2004 within the target band. As monetary policy exerts its
influence on inflation by a longer-than-12-month transmission and there are limitations
on tightening, the Monetary Council has decided to focus on the inflation target for
2004. Given the limitations imposed by the exchange rate band, the Monetary Council
has provided a flexible interpretation even of the projection for 2004: it has already
given a clear indication of its not wishing to tighten monetary policy despite the fact
inflation is expected to stand at a level higher than the 3.5-percent central parity of the
inflation target band.
The MNB used to project inflation, relying on the month-on-month average of the
forint’s exchange rate. In February 2003, the Bank abandoned this methodology,
preparing its projection based on a HUF/EUR 245 exchange rate, while the January
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average stood at around HUF/EUR 240. By projecting an exchange rate closely
approximating the going market rate, the Bank intended to send the message of its
being bent on avoiding any appreciation. 
Investors deemed a weaker forint after the speculative attack as temporary, believing
that the exchange rate would re-appreciate to the level prior to the attack. They thought
that in order for the inflation target to be met, a stronger exchange rate would be
needed, so they were in anticipation of the Bank’s projections for future exchange rate
paths. The HUF/EUR 245 exchange rate specified in the Report on inflation and
refocusing on the inflation target for 2004 that can be met with an exchange rate that is
weaker than the one needed for the 2003 target were unambiguous message to
speculators that the Bank was willing to maintain a weaker-than-earlier exchange rate
even permanently. This spurred speculators to withdraw their capital and stabilised
both the rate of exchange and exchange rate expectations.
Restoration of the instrumental framework
On 24 February 2003, the Monetary Council passed a decision on restoring the
monetary instruments to their state prior to the speculative attack. Accordingly, the
interest rate corridor surrounding the central bank base rate was narrowed to 1%,
simultaneously with removing the quantity restriction from the two-week deposit
facility. This reinstatement of the instrumental framework was enabled by winding up
most of the speculative foreign currency open positions.
Even though the rise in effective yields could have been implemented by gradual
measures, in most probability, such an approach could not have been applied to the
exchange rate. This is because the degree of exchange rate strengthening depends not
only on how the prevailing interest rate is changed – the signal intended by a particular
central bank measure is also important. Should the Bank have changed any of the
parameters of the provisional measure, the market would have interpreted it as a
message that the base rate would be shortly restored to its status as effective rate. Thus,
the impact on the exchange rate would not have differed significantly from that of one-
step reinstatement. 
The one-step reinstatement conveyed a clear message to investors, namely that the
provisional period of defence against the speculative attack had ended,  consolidation
was complete and the inflation target had returned into the focus of monetary policy.
The restoration of instruments was supported by two factors which restricted the
expected strengthening in the exchange rate and removed the threat of any major
appreciation. First, in its statement on 10 February, the Monetary Council made it plain
that it was satisfied with the HUF/EUR 245 exchange rate and that the current level of
exchange rates was appropriate for meeting the inflation target in 2004. This   signal
made a strong impact on market participants’ exchange rate expectations. Second,
there were still sizeable long forint positions relative to the size of the Hungarian
market, which dampened the rate of appreciation.
As evidence of the success of restoring the instruments, long yields and the forint
exchange rate appeared to be stable. Following the announcement of the measure,
yields in the government securities markets increased in inverse proportion to the term
to maturity of instruments. While overnight interbank rates rose by 2 percentage points
similar to the overnight central bank deposit rate, yields on three-month and one-year
government securities increased by only 87 and 18 basis points respectively, and the
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yields on three and five-year bonds, most sought after by non-residents, remained
virtually unchanged.   
Market operations following the reinstatement of monetary instruments 
The market operations following the reinstatement of monetary instruments were
primarily aimed at preventing the outflow of the remaining speculative capital from
causing any excessive fluctuations in yields or the exchange rate. Therefore the euro
sales also continued after the reinstatement of the instruments, but at a slower pace.
While not aimed at influencing the forint exchange rate, the small amounts of currency
sales  enabled the winding up of speculative positions.
The MNB continued the silent intervention until 23 May, bringing the amount of euros
sold at the market exchange rate to EUR 3.8 billion. Of the EUR 5.3 billion inflow of
hot capital arising through the Bank’s intervention at the band edge, a further amount
of approximately EUR 1.2 billion was cooled off by means of market participants’
hedging transactions. This enabled the MNB to declare that virtually all the capital
associated with the speculation on appreciation had left the country. Therefore the
MNB announced that from 26 May it would stop intervening within the band and
return to its former strategy of using interest rate policy to control the exchange rate. 
Market developments
Changes in the exchange rate 
The measures taken by the MNB to fend off the speculative attack successfully cooled
down expectations of a shift in the band, causing the exchange rate to depreciate
rapidly at a rate in the range of 4 to 6 per cent. In the aftermath of the termination of
the speculative attack, the market seemed to be in an uncertain situation for a short
time, which was reflected in increased exchange rate volatility (see Chart 4). However,
in early February the volatility of the exchange rate went back to the average rate seen
in 2002, while the exchange rate of the forint stabilised around the HUF 245/euro
level, specified by the MNB.
According to the Reuters survey of market analysts, average exchange rate
expectations at end-2003 declined from HUF 235.4 per euro in December 2002 to
HUF 238.7 per euro in January 2003 and HUF 241 per euro in April 2003. The analyst
expectations also indicate that in the wake of fending off the speculative attack the
credibility of the forint’s intervention band increased considerably.
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Chart 4: Forint/euro exchange rate and its daily volatility
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Changes in rates
Following speculation on appreciation, overnight interbank interest rates got stuck at
the bottom of the interest rate corridor, staying there fast until the reinstatement of
monetary policy instruments (see Chart 5). This had to do partly with the large inflow
of excess funds, and partly with the fact that due to the quantity restriction imposed on
two-week deposits, the rate on overnight deposits had become the effective rate. The
overnight yield on foreign currency swaps, an instrument primarily used by foreign
investors, remained below the rate on central bank deposits, owing to the transaction
costs incurred by banks.
Chart 5: Key policy interest rates of the MNB versus money market rates
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Developments in short-term yields in the government securities market were governed
by market expectations of the likely date of restoring the original instruments. In late
January, investors expected the instruments to be restored within a month. The
publication of the Quarterly Report on Inflation on 10 February and the attached
statement by the Monetary Council led investors to believe that the Bank intended to
maintain the low level of interest rates over a longer-than-expected horizon (see Chart
6). This led to a drop in yields on short-term government securities, with a decline of
approximately 60 basis points in the yield on three-month benchmark discount treasury
bills (see Chart 5).
In the wake of the speculation on appreciation, forward spreads started to rise relative
to the euro area (see Chart 7). The wider spread points to an increase in inflation
expectations and the risk premium required by investors, in addition to an expectation
of the postponement of the date of entry into Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
However, the expectation of a later date for adopting the euro can be attributed to
higher inflation expectations only in small part, as it is more the result of the
difficulties associated with meeting the Maastricht criterion for the budget deficit.
Chart 6: Market expectations of the likely date of restoring the original set of instruments 
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Reuters survey of market analysts shows that the credibility of the inflation targets has
declined only temporarily. In particular, the consensus rate of inflation expected at
end-2003 rose from 4.88% in December to 5.12% in February, to fall below 5%
(4.93%) in April, thanks to favourable developments in inflation. After a temporary
rise in inflation expectations for December 2004, a date of top priority for the MNB,
the 4.11% forecast of the April survey is only marginally higher than the 4.05% in
January. The average of analysts’ expectations has been invariably within the 1 per
cent tolerance range surrounding the inflation target of 3.5% set for 2004. 
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Chart 7: Forward spreads of Hungarian government securities relative to the euro area
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Following the MNB’s interest rate cut in January, commercial banks also reduced their
rates significantly. As corporate loans are in large part linked to BUBOR, they tend to
react rapidly to changes in the level of money market rates. By contrast, in their rates
on deposits and fixed interest loans, banks followed the MNB’s altogether 100 basis
point cut only partially in November and December. The interest rate changes made by
commercial banks following the central bank’s January cut contained not only the
overall 200 basis point central bank reduction at the time of the speculative attack, but
also the previous two 50 basis point cuts. At the same time, as banks expected the
original set of instruments to be reinstated within a short time, they mostly ignored the
reduction in overnight rates in excess of that in the base rate when pricing their deposit
and loan facilities. In this way, the provisional changes made in the three-month
instruments did not cause considerable additional volatility in yields. The average rate
of the rise following the sizeable interest rate reduction on instruments with this
maturity was on average no higher than 20 to 30 basis points (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Developments in three-month corporate and household deposit rates in the period between
November 2002 and March 2003 (basis points)6
Mean Mean weighted by the 
reserve ratio 
Maximum Minimum
Fall in corporate deposit rates 239 249 390 74
Adjustment 26 21 130 0
Fall in household deposit rates 275 251 385 195
Adjustment 28 33 80 0
Total cut in MNB key policy rate 300
Rates on consumer credit and mortgage loans fell by 150 to 200 basis points. Based on
the interest rate conditions published by large banks, household and corporate deposit
                                                
6 The average of the 10 banks with largest reserve requirements, according to publicly available terms
and conditions. 
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rates, in respect of the most prominent three-month maturity, declined at an
approximately 50 basis points lower rate than did the MNB’s rates as a whole.
By contrast, at the shortest maturities, corporate deposit rates fell at a rate exceeding
that of the central bank move by 50 to 100 basis points. This was partly because the
level of interest rates on variable interest corporate loans was also reduced at a 50 – 75
basis point higher rate than the central bank’s 300 basis point cut (in line with the
three-month BUBOR). Furthermore, short maturities are more closely linked to money
market rates, which typically respond quickly to central bank moves. As short-term
lending has a great weight in corporate lending, statistics reveal that corporate deposit
and lending rates overreacted to the reduction in the central bank base rate in respect of
less-than-one-year terms to maturity. As a result, these markets experienced a sizeable,
120 basis point, correction in March (see Chart 8).
Chart 8: Average monthly rates of interest on credit institutions’ short-term facilities 
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Developments in liquidity 
The speculative attack designed to cause a shift in the exchange rate band forced the
MNB to purchase large amounts of foreign currency at a rate near the upper edge of
the band. The purchase of foreign currency and corresponding sale of forints led to a
liquidity surplus of the banking sector, amounting to over HUF 1,200 billion, the
equivalent of the intervention amount. Having more excess forint supply than needed
to meet the reserve requirement even prior to the speculative attack, banks deposited
the intervention outflow of forints with the MNB.
The central bank’s intervention purchase caused an increase in international reserves
on the assets side of the balance sheet. Simultaneously, a number of balance sheet
items changed substantially on the liabilities side, too, partly in connection with the
alteration of monetary policy instruments. As the MNB imposed a restriction on the
accepted quantity of two-week deposits, in the absence of other alternatives the excess
supply of funds created by the intervention had to go into overnight deposits. This
raised the level of overnight deposits to over HUF 1,200 billion in the first few days
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after the speculative attack. This meant that in the provisional period, the sterilisation
function of the two-week deposits was taken over by the overnight deposits. The
implication is that there was no increase in the monetary base, calculated, using former
statistical methods, as the sum of cash balances and banks’ current accounts.7
Table 3: Balance sheet of the MNB (HUF billions)
A./I. Claims on foreign 
residents (i.+ii.) 2652 3744 3463 3364 L./I. Monetary base (i.+ii.) 1646 1656 1498 1577
i. International reserves 2332 3461 3171 3100 i. Banknotes in circulation 1280 1266 1275 1288
ii. Other claims 320 284 292 263 ii. Current accounts of banks 366 390 223 290
A./II. Claims on banks 23 21 20 20 L./II. 2-week deposits 136 200 538 642
A./III. Claims on central 
government 1216 1232 1112 1094 L./III. O/N deposits 419 1066 326 76
A./IV. Other assets 132 119 113 114 L./IV. Liabilities to central government 198 500 720 536
Treasury accounts 51 383 484 358
L./V. Liabilities to foreign residents 1385 1414 1331 1372
L./VI. Net other items 240 280 295 389
TOTAL 4024 5116 4708 4591 TOTAL 4024 5116 4708 4591
31/Dec/
2002
31/Jan/
2003
31/Mar/
2003Liabilities
28/Feb/
2003Assets
31/Dec/
2002
31/Jan/
2003
28/Feb/
2003
31/Mar/
2003
Bold type denotes balance sheet items on which the intervention in the foreign exchange market, or the
change in monetary policy instruments, had a direct or indirect impact. The figures for the monetary
base in the table are derived as the sum of currency in circulation and credit institutions’ current account
balances, but exclude overnight deposits. 
The quantity restriction on two-week deposits was interpreted by many as the MNB’s
failure to sterilise the money supply created by the intervention, a potential source of
inflationary pressure. In reality, the forint outflow created as a result of the Bank
intervening at the upper end of the exchange rate band was virtually fully soaked up by
the overnight deposits. Hence, the liquidity surplus caused no direct inflationary
pressure. At the same time, interbank rates dropped to the level of the overnight
deposit rate of 3.5%, lower than inflation. Had this low level of interest rates persisted,
it could have triggered rapid credit expansion and a sharp rise in the rate of money
growth. As, however, the reinstatement of the original set of instruments on 24
February terminated the period of low short-term rates and commerical banks also
adjusted their deposit and lending rates to the key policy rate of 6.5%, the temporary
change in monetary policy instruments exerted no inflationary pressure via either the
money supply or the rates of interest.
The appearance of a sizeable liquidity surplus had led to major reallocation in
commercial banks’ positions in the interbank market. Prior to the speculative attack,
some banks, primarily those with a strong lending profile, had suffered from a shortage
of liquidity, while those specialised in taking deposits had had a liquidity surplus. This
                                                
7 In line with statistical harmonisation with the ECB, as of January 2003, the monetary base also
comprises overnight deposits maintained at the MNB, in addition to the notes and coin and current
accounts. The changeover to the new statistical method accounts for the upsurge in the annual growth
rate of the monetary base seen in January and February 2003. Following the restoration of the monetary
policy instruments and the waning off of the substantial inflows into overnight deposits, the growth rate
returned to previous levels in March 2003.
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had divided banks into deposit takers and lenders in terms of interbank positions.
However, the speculative attack had supplied with excess liquidity primarily those
domestic banks which had previously faced a shortage. This had sharply altered the
previous strong concentration of excess liquidity. 
After the upsurge in liquidity in the aftermath of the speculative attack, excess liquidity
started to decline gradually, due to two factors. First, as short-term money market rates
fell sharply, also having a considerable impact on the short section of the yield curve,
treasury bill auctions started to experience substantial excess demand, which prompted
the ÁKK (Government Debt Management Agency) to raise the amount of treasury bills
offered, which in turn brought down the excess liqudity by HUF 80 billion. Second, the
central bank’s intervention by purchasing forints also reduced the excess supply of
liquidity gradually and far in excess of the former measure. As a combined result of the
two effects, the supply of excess liquidity was reduced to its half by over HUF 600
billion before early March. Simultaneously, the level of overnight deposits maintained
by the MNB also dropped to approximately HUF 600 billion prior to the
announcement of the restoration of the original instruments.
Chart 9: Distribution of liquidity surplus among central bank instruments 
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When setting the quantity to be invited for the two-week deposit tenders, the MNB
only took into account the effects on liquidity of non-intervention factors within the
banking sector, namely the projected level of currency in circulation and the
government’s account maintained at the MNB. Even though the liquidity conditions
would have justified a moderate change in the quantity of two-week deposits tendered,
due primarily to an increase in the Treasury Account (KESZ), the MNB did not change
the HUF 100 billion cap applied during the provisional period. There was a
communication argument that such a change would have affected market participants’
expectations of central bank measures in an undesirable manner. The tendered amounts
were allocated by the MNB in the face of manifold excess demand, due to the
significant yield advantage of the two-week deposits relative to the overnight deposits. 
In line with the terms and conditions of business transactions observed by the MNB,
the initial procedure applied in the event of overbidding only permitted allocation by
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dealing cards8, which basically meant that each bank was allowed to deposit equal
amounts in the two-week facility at a rate of 6.5%. Therefore as early as it could do it
(any change in business terms and conditions must be announced two weeks before it
is implemented), the MNB replaced the card dealing method with an allocation rule
based on previous year’s reserve requirement. This method openly gave preference to
domestic deposit taking banks, pushing up their share in the two-week deposits. This
move by the MNB made an even more definite distinction between the levels of
interest rates available to the speculative capital and the domestic banking sector. As a
result of the allocation adjusted to the reserve requirement, the level of interest rates
available for domestic deposit taking banks approached the key policy rate of 6.5%.
Furthermore, an even greater share of the excess supply of liquidity created by the
Bank intervening at the edge of the forint band was forced to flow into the overnight
deposits offering a rate of 3.5%. Even though this allocation method was also subject
to criticism (as certain types of domestic funds are exempt from the reserve
requirement), this system of weights was capable, within limitations, of effectively
barring non-resident speculators from high-interest-bearing two-week deposits.
Moreover, it prevented the five-week quantity restriction imposed on deposits from
unreasonably dampening banks’ rates on deposit taking from households and
companies.
Due to the restriction on deposit quantity and the upsurge in the volume of overnight
deposits, the level of overnight interest rates was stuck at the lower edge of the interest
rate corridor (3.5%), even sinking below the central bank overnight rate temporarily.
The fact that the overnight interest rate was outside the interest rate corridor can be
accounted for by certain banks also having limits vis-à-vis  the central bank. In
particular, under their internal regulations they cannot place deposits with the MNB in
excess of a certain value. These banks deposited the remaining funds in the interbank
market at a lower interest rate, due to the low demand for liquidity. After the
reinstatement of the set of instruments and the lifting of quantity restrictions on  two-
week deposits, banks were enabled to re-channel their liquidity from overnight
deposits into the two-week facility. After early March 2003 and simultaneously with
the drop in the volume of overnight deposits, the overnight interest rate level broke
away from the edge of the interest rate corridor returning to its centre (6.5%), similarly
to the period prior to the speculative attack.
The foreign currency purchase in defence of the exchange rate band and the subsequent
intra-band intervention as well as the rise in the Treasury Account led to a total of HUF
600 billion excess supply of forints relative to the period before the speculative attack.
Following the reinstatement of the original instruments (on 24 February), this amount
appeared in the two-week deposits. In addition, the excess liquidity sterilised by the
two-week deposits continued to decline due to the MNB selling euros, bringing down
the average monthly level to approximately HUF 500 billion. Historically, this is not
an exceptionally large volume of sterilisation instruments, given that under the
crawling peg regime, the volume of sterilisation instruments occasionally amounted to
HUF 800-1000 billion, a much higher volume, while the forint/euro interest rate
                                                
8 Should the amount offered be overbidden, the amount to be sold would be allocated between bids with
identical rates so that all competing bids receive the same amount of securities in each allocation round
until the quantity to be sold is exhausted.
31
differential was far above the current rate. This implies that the past monetary policy
instruments had successfully managed a much higher volume of sterilisation
instruments. In brief, this after-effect of the speculation episode gives no cause for
concern with respect to the operation of monetary policy instruments. 
Chart 10: Average monthly volumes of sterilisation instruments, September 1998 - April 2002
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Lessons to be drawn from the speculative episode 
Winners and losers
The losers of the speculation on appreciation are clearly the foreign speculators who
initiated the intervention on 15 and 16 January. Their loss was somewhere between 8
and 14 forints per euro, depending on how they could wind up their forint positions
after 16 January. Based on the Bank’s calculations, they realised most of their total loss
of approximately HUF 60 billion (EUR 240 million) by 23 May.
The MNB sold EUR 3.8 billion of the amounts purchased at a rate of HUF/EUR
234.69, at the strong end of the exchange rate band. The MNB earned an exchange rate
gain of HUF 43 billion on these transactions. The exchange rate gain arising on the
intra-band repurchase of forints will be stated in the MNB’s profit and loss account for
2003, as well as under retained earnings. Under the MNB Act in effect9, the MNB shall
contribute to the Budget as dividend the mean of the profits earned in the second, third
and fourth years preceding the reviewed year.  This means that the exchange rate gain
earned in 2003 will be contributed to the Budget in three instalments over the period
between 2006 and 2008. 
As foreign currency assets in the MNB’s balance sheet exceed its foreing currency
liabilities, the weakening of the forint exchange rate will also lead to a non-realised
                                                
9 Section 65, Act LVIII of 2001. 
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exchange rate gain. Unlike the realised exchange rate gain, the non-realised exchange
rate gain is not stated in income, and is therefore not paid in to the Budget. This is
because, in contrast to the realised exchange rate gain which remains unaffected by
changes in the exchange rate of the forint, the non-realised exchange rate gain is
subject to the forint’s current exchange rate, and thus, for prudential considerations,
cannot be included among the constituents of income. At the same time, the exchange
rate gain earned by the MNB on the weakening of the forint is accompanied by an
exchange rate loss arising on the government’s foreign currency debt. 
As a combined result of the intervention at the edge of the exchange rate band and
subsequent euro sales, the stock of sterilisation instruments within the balance sheet of
the MNB increased. As the interest payment on sterilisation instruments exceeds the
yield on foreign currency reserves, an increase would reduce the MNB’s profit. At the
same time, the speculation on the appreciation of the forint caused the level of key
policy rates to decrease sharply, by 2%. This narrowed the difference between the rate
on sterilisation instruments and that on foreign currency reserves. All in all, the effect
of the increase in sterilisation insruments was offset by the effect of the drop in interest
rates. Thus, the speculation on appreciation had not pushed up the costs of sterilisation
or caused the MNB’s interest income to deteriorate.
Foreign speculators bought the euros needed to close their forint positions partly from
Hungarian exporters who, in this way, realised their export revenues in advance via
related forward transactions. Whether these companies will earn a profit on these
hedging transactions will depend on the exchange rate of the forint at the time when
the forward deals mature. One thing is certain: the exporters can rely on the knowledge
of the accurate size of the future forint value of their receipts and are thus not exposed
to fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
In 2003 Q1, after-tax profits of the banking sector increased by over 50% relative to
the corresponding period a year earlier. Furthermore, return on assets rose by over
10%. The increases were primarily due to the 14% rise in interest income, in addition
to an upsurge in income from commissions and the profit from financial transactions.
Within the latter category, the income earned on securities transactions rose the most
buoyantly, but the profit on foreign currency transactions also increased at over 5%.
Banks’ revenues from their activity as dealers, was improved by the pick-up in foreign
exchange market turnover, spot deals and foreign currency swaps in particular. In sum,
banks made substantial excess profits, due primarily to the beneficial impact of the
drop in yields. 
The stability of the financial sector
Despite the apparent uncertainty in the aftermath of the speculation on appreciation,
the speculation itself or the subsequent changes in yields and the exchange rate posed
no threat to the stability of the Hungarian financial intermediary sector. The prudential
rules of the financial regulatory framework (such as capital requirements assigned by
the trading book to individual risks, for instance) and banks’ internal regulations kept
risk exposure at a low level even in the beginning, which prevented the income and
liquidity position of the sector from being shaken even in the temporarily more volatile
financial environment. While the daily turnover of VIBER (RTGS) was on certain days
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more than four times that of the previous average, the payment system suffered no
interruptions either.10 
The Bank’s change on 16 January in monetary policy instruments successfully
separated permanent and temporary effects, in line with the Bank’s intentions. The
level of interest rates effective with respect to the speculative capital sank below 3.5%,
while the 6.5% rate on two-week deposits remained the effective rate for long-term
government securities and commercial bank rates. This means that interest rate
volatility was successfully localised, that is, it did not spread from the interbank market
to the market of longer-term government securities, commercial deposits and loans.
The intervention’s impact on the money supply was first sterilised by means of the
overnight deposits and, following the restoration of the original set of instruments,  the
two-week deposits. Thus, there was no increase in the money supply that would have
exerted inflationary pressures or posed a risk to the stability of the financial system.
Implications for monetary policy 
It is possible to defend the strong edge of the exchange rate band 
The speculation on appreciation proved to be unsuccessful. It failed partly because in
contrast to the experience of a number of emerging countries and previous ERM crises,
this time the speculation was intended to force out revaluation of the domestic currency
(forint) rather than its devaluation. Therefore, it seems to be more appropriate to speak
about an attack ‘in favour of’ the forint rather than against it. Even though volume data
and foreign exchange market products clearly show that the liberalisation of foreign
exchange rules potentially boosted speculators’ power, this recent experience reveals
that it is much more difficult to ‘defeat’ the central bank at the strong edge of the
exchange rate band than at the weak edge. This is partly because here the intervention
causes foreign currency reserves to increase, which has no natural upper limit. Second,
fending off this kind of speculation needs a reduction in interest rates, which is, in the
short term, significantly less worrying for the financial sector than a major rise in
interest rates which follows speculation aimed at  pressuring monetary authorities to
devalue. 
The fact that the speculation on the appreciation of the forint was unjustified and
irrational in many respects made easier the defence against it. First, the equilibrium
exchange rate of the forint is within the prevailing exchange rate band, which implies
that, in contrast to some market participants’ expectations in January, the forint is not
likely to follow an upward trend over the coming period. Second, many speculators
were not aware that under the MNB Act a shift in the exchange rate band would also
require approval from the Government. This and the realisation of the monetary
authorities’ commitment to maintaining the exchange rate band were among the factors
behind the reversal of the capital flows within a short time.
The successful defense against the speculative attack boosted the credibility of the
exchange rate regime. The largescale foreign currency purchase and temporary, but
drastic, central bank interest rate cut testified to the MNB’s determination to maintain
                                                
10 Operating hours were extended only on one single day at the request of some credit institutions (on 21
January VIBER accepted instructions until 17:30 instead of 16:30.) 
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the exchange rate system. Furthermore, the exchange rate loss incurred by the
speculators made it clear that the Bank was capable of successful control of such
attacks against the forint’s exchange rate. 
Monetary easing, continuing disinflation
The main monetary policy implications of the, in many respects, irrational and
unjustified speculation is that the exchange rate band poses a more powerful barrier for
the Bank than previously thought. In particular, the possibility of speculative attacks
makes it especially risky to keep the exchange rate at the strong edge of the band.
Therefore the MNB had to accept that the forint’s exchange rate would be weaker than
it was over the two or three months prior to the speculative attack. Thus,
accommodating a weaker exchange rate, the MNB was forced to ease monetary policy.
Seeking sufficient distance from the strong end of the exchange rate band, the Bank set
a rate of HUF/EUR 245 as the desirable level. In further evidence of its
accommodation of the more depreciated exchange rate, the Bank has announced a shift
in the Bank’s focus from the end-2003 inflation target to that at end-2004, as the
former was largely beyond the control of monetary policy.
During late 2002, a period of special importance from the point of view of wage
negotiations and price increases, the exchange rate of the forint was close to the strong
edge of the exchange rate band, further reinforcing the disinflationary effect of the
ongoing appreciation. Data on inflation and wages for the past few months show that
the disinflationary impact of the strong exchange rate gained momentum at end-2002
and early 2003. Core inflation, that excludes the effect of volatile items (such as food
and oil), fell by 0.9 percentage points between November 2002 and April 2003.
Furthermore, disinflation accelerated with regard to goods and services (such as
tradables, market services and processed food) under control of monetary policy and
the exchange rate.11 Wage growths in the manufacturing sector declined significantly
in 2002 Q4 and 2003 Q1.
Because of the speculative episode in January, the MNB had to accommodate an
exchange rate level that was weaker than previously. However, due to the monetary
tightening earlier and a number of  external factors, the period since the speculation has
seen a rise in the probability of meeting the inflation target of 3.5% 1% set for 2004,
even under an exchange rate of roughly HUF/EUR 245.
                                                
11 The past few months have seen a decline in tradables prices, taking account of seasonal effects, in
evidence of strong disinflationary pressure exerted by the exchange rate.
